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Abstract—A physical unclonable function (PUF) generates hardware intrinsic volatile secrets by exploiting uncontrollable
manufacturing randomness. Although PUFs provide the potential for lightweight and secure authentication for increasing numbers of
low-end Internet of Things devices, practical and secure mechanisms remain elusive. Our work aims to explore simulatable PUFs
(SimPUFs) that are physically unclonable but efficiently modeled mathematically through privileged one-time PUF access to address
the problem of authentication for resource limited devices. Given a challenge, a securely stored SimPUF in possession of a trusted
server computes the corresponding response and its bit-specific reliability. Consequently, naturally noisy PUF responses generated by
a resource limited prover can be immediately processed by a one-way function (OWF) and transmitted to a server, because the
resourceful server can exploit the SimPUF to perform a trial-and-error search over likely error patterns to recover the noisy response to
authenticate the prover. Security of trial-and-error reverse (TREVERSE) authentication under the random oracle model is guaranteed
by the hardness of inverting the OWF. We formally evaluate the authentication capability of TREVERSE authentication with two
SimPUFs experimentally derived from popular silicon PUFs. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our novel authentication
mechanism can replace classical entity/client authentication without reliance on digitally stored non-volatile keys.
Index Terms—PUF, simulatable PUF, trial-and-error, lightweight authentication, reliability confidence, server-aided.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) exploit manufacturing
imperfections to extract hardware instance-specific secrets
on demand. The unavoidable fabrication variations endows
the PUF with physically unclonability. Thus, even the same
manufacturer is incapable of forging two PUFs exhibiting
identical behaviors. As a function, the PUF takes inputs
(challenges) and react with instance-specific outputs (re-
sponses) referred to as challenge-response pairs (CRPs). The
first silicon PUF, coined the Arbiter PUF (APUF) [1] was
created in 2002. Since then, various PUF types such as ring
oscillator PUF (ROPUF) [2], [3], SRAM PUF [4], [5] and
others [6] are proposed.
The PUF is to address secure key storage problem that
does not rely on permanently presenting a key in dig-
ital form distinguishing from the traditional non-volatile
memory (NVM) based key storage mechanism. While also
minimizing the manufacture cost attributing to the fact that
popular silicon PUFs are compatible with current CMOS
fabrication processes, avoiding additional masks and pro-
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cessing steps required when fabricating NVM such as EEP-
ROM and its successor Flash [2], [7], [8].
Realizing the two primary PUF applications: i) secure
cryptographic key derivation; and ii) lightweight authenti-
cation, however, is non-trivial in practice. The major hurdle
is the naturally noisy nature of PUF responses. Most stud-
ied and popular silicon PUF responses are susceptible to
thermal noise, environmental parameter (e.g., temperature,
voltage) fluctuations. PUF based cryptographic primitive
engineers address noisy responses using two approaches:
PUF re-engineering: Generate intrinsically high reliable
responses as in digital PUFs [9]–[11] or determining re-
sponse reliability and only employing those highly reli-
able response as in a sense amplifier PUF (SAPUF) con-
structions [12]. The digital PUF and SAPUF, however, are
not general approaches but are special PUF constructions.
The former requires dedicated custom design considera-
tions [10], [11] and special fabrication steps such as hot car-
rier injection [9]. The bitmap of reliable responses (pointing
reliable bit location) of the later, as a helper data, should be
only readable but not writable to an attacker, which implies
it has to be saved on-chip via ROM or hardwired [12].
Fuzzy Extractors: Use of fuzzy extractors is a generic
approach to all PUF types and thus is dominant, which
generates helper data to allow the subsequent correction
of generated responses [2], [7], [13]. Unfortunately, fuzzy
extractor implementations require significant hardware and
computational resources. A reference FPGA implementation
of a BCH code based extractor in [14] costs 149 FPGA slices;
for comparison a SPONGENT-128 hashing implementation
uses only 22 slices. In terms of induced time latency, error
correction related computations consumes 5,0831 clock cy-
cles while the hashing only consumes 3,990 clock cycles.
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Fig. 1. TREVERSE considers three parties: the server, the resource-
constraint token and the adversary. The server holds a SimPUF that is a
parameterized model of the physical PUF to not only accurately emulate
the response e but also compute its corresponding reliability confidence
conf . The confidence is never evaluated by the token and never exposed.
In other words, removing the ECC reduces up to 87%
hardware overhead and 92% latency. Furthermore, required
helper data from fuzzy extractor has been exploited in
helper data manipulation attacks [7], [13], [15] as well as
noise information based side channel attacks [16], [17].
We observe that previous works have not fully leveraged
unique properties of the PUF. By looking at the response
characteristic closer, to be precise, leveraging the digital-
ized response bit itself and most importantly its bit-specific
reliability in an oblivious manner. We present TREVERSE
authentication:
1) For the first time, popular PUFs to date can directly
work with an one-way function (OWF) primitive, thus,
evading costly overhead for error correction mecha-
nism, which in essence greatly hurts the lightweight
performance of PUF applications.
2) In addition, associated helper data that is potentially
exploitable by an adversary is not needed anymore.
3) Further, the TREVERSE mechanism is not limited to
resolve authentication problem for a special PUF type,
e.g., digital PUF and SAPUF [10], [11], but a wide range
of PUF constructions, especially those prevalent ones
including APUF, ROPUF and SRAM PUF, as long as an
SimPUF has been enrolled by the server.
1.1 TREVERSE Overview
The TREVERSE, depicted in Fig. 1, consists of three play-
ers: the resource-rich server, the resource-constraint token
and the adversary. The server holds a SimPUF that is a
parameterized model of the simulatable PUF embedded
within the token1. Enrollment of the SimPUF is a one-time
task conducted by the server in a secure environment before
releasing the simulatable PUF integrated token. Acquisition
of SimPUF by any other parties afterwards is disabled, e.g.,
by fusing the access wire to the PUF response. For the server,
it utilizes the SimPUF to not only accurately compute the
response bit e but also evaluate its reliability confidence
conf given a random challenge c. Within the token, the
OWF immediately processes the regenerated response e˜.
1. To be clear, whenever the simulatable PUF is used, it always means
the physical PUF. While the SimPUF always refers to the parameterized
model of that physical PUF.
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Fig. 2. An example of sorting reliability confidence of responses. Lower
the reliability (closer to zero), higher the ranking. The highest ranked
m—m = 3 for example—response bits are marked as unknown, be-
cause their regenerations, e.g., e˜5, e˜1, e˜2, are more likely to be flipped
and thus differing from e5, e1, e2.
When deployed in-the-flied, the token expands a re-
ceived challenge seed (master challenge) cs into n sub-
challenges via a linear feedback shift register (LFSR): the cs
is issued by the server. Then it generates the corresponding
e˜. The tilde line is used here to distinguish the enrolled
response e in the server side, because usually e 6= e˜.
Without error correcting, e˜ is processed and the output
r˜=OWF(e˜) is sent back to the server for authentication.
The server who securely manages the SimPUF emulates
e and computes corresponding reliability confidence conf .
To ease descriptions, we take an 8-bit e as an example
(cf. Fig. 2). Following algorithm 1, the server performs
TREVERSE authentication. Given the n-bit response e, it
sorts all bits’ reliability according to the conf , procedure
sorting in algorithm 1. Consequently, an index vector ranks
each response bit’s reliability in a descending manner; lower
the reliability, higher the ranking. For example, index1 is
corresponding to e5 and index2 is corresponding to e1.
The m, where m < n, response bits, eindex1 , ..., eindexm ,
are response bits with lowest reliability, which have very
high chance to be erroneous under regeneration. The rest
n−m response bits, e˜indexm+1 , ..., e˜indexn , will be reproduced
reliably2.
For the m-bit unreliable response bits, eindex1 , ..., eindexm ,
the server tries all possible error combinations (patterns).
While for the remaining n − m reliable response bits, the
server sticks with the response values emulated via the
SimPUF. Taking an example, in Fig. 2, for an enrolled n-
bit, n = 8, response e and m = 3, we suppose that
the regenerated e˜ is ”01100011”. During authentication, the
server tries all possible combinations according to the order
of e5, e1 and e2—they are remarked as unknown symbol ‘x’
in the enrolled e—and compares the computed r =OWF(e)
with received r˜. We assume that the server tries e5, e1 and e2
using ”000”, ”001”, ...., ”110”, ”111” patterns in a sequential
order and checks r accordingly. We easily see that within
two trials the authenticity of the token is accepted because
r = r˜. Notably, the worst case is checking, at most, 2m trials.
If all trials fail, the authenticity of the token is rejected.
1.2 Goals and Contributions
It was commonly believed that it is infeasible to hash
(implementation of OWF in practice) PUF response directly.
Because the unexpected response errors will disrupt the
2. It shall be clear later that the setting of m is flexible according to
such as the expected operating condition range of the PUF token and
other factors, which will be experimentally validated in Section 5 and
Section 6.
3Algorithm 1 TREVERSE authentication
1: procedure sorting (e, conf ) . Sorting reliability of e
according to conf . Lower the reliability, higher the ranking.
2: Quicksort or other sorting methodologies.
3: return index. . index is a vector, e.g., index1 and index2
are 5 and 1, respectively, for the example case in Fig. 2.
4: end procedure
5: procedure authentication (e, r˜, index)
6: for i = 1 : 2m do . m is
a tunable parameter determining the top ranked m responses in
index will to be tried and checked.
7: Try one possible error for m response bits—eindex1 ,...,
eindexm . For the rest n−m response bits using the enrolled
values. One possible e is ready for trial.
8: r =OWF(e)
9: if r=r˜ then . r˜ is from the token, where r˜ = OWF(e˜).
10: Accept authenticity.
11: return
12: end if
13: end for
14: if none of the above 2m trials successes then
15: Abort or initiate the next round TREVERSE authen-
tication.
16: end if
17: end procedure
NVM
OWF
c k
r
nonce
Fig. 3. Authentication baseline: digital key based dynamic entity/client
authentication [19].
hashed value and hence impedes successful authentications.
Response errors, thereof, have to be reconciled via the error
correction code (ECC) logic assisted by priorly computed
helper data. Unfortunately, the ECC logic is very expensive
(cf. Section 7.1.1). In addition, the helper data results into
attack surface—e.g., leaking exploitable information to an
adversary to perform modeling attacks through noise side-
channel information [17] and helper data manipulation at-
tacks [15], [18]. Thus, for popular silicon PUFs including LA-
PUF, ROPUF and SRAM PUF, a simple, efficient lightweight
secure authentications is regarded as a great challenge [17],
[19]–[21].
This work devises a PUF authentication mechanism,
TREVERSE authentication, that is lightweight, secure and
practical without suffering from the deficiencies aforemen-
tioned. To be precise, we present two specific TREVERSE
instantiations. Eventually, implementation of one instan-
tiation, forward referring to Fig. 7, in the token side is
on par with the NVM stored digital key based classical
dynamic authentication, shown in Fig. 3 that is treated as the
authentication baseline. The other TREVERSE instantiation,
forward referring to Fig. 8, even removes the nonce that is a
must in the authentication baseline.
We make the following contributions in this work:
• We devise the TREVERSE authentication. It is a trial-
and-error approach trying and checking all potential
response errors by the server, which fully leverages
the securely enrolled SimPUF to successfully authen-
ticate PUF tokens.
• We, counter-intuitively, directly process PUF re-
sponses through OWF without error correcting. As
a consequence, helper data is no longer involved.
We comprehensively evaluate the TREVERSE au-
thentication security, in particular, being against all
presently known modeling attacks under the random
oracle model.
• We demonstrate that the TREVERSE authentica-
tion is a generic scheme as long as the SimPUF
exists. While we observe that most PUFs having
corresponding SimPUFs, for example, linear addi-
tive PUFs (APUF and k-sum ROPUF) [1], [22]–[24],
SRAM PUFs [4], ROPUFs [2]
• We validate the top efficacy and practicability of
the TREVERSE authentication through both formal-
ized analyses and extensively experiments. We show
that the authentication only takes (tens) thousands
of trials and checks—can be further easily reduced
according to our presented techniques, which is
eventually negligible to the computational resource
rich server. Thereof, the TREVERSE authentication
is capable of handling a bunch of requests from a
number of tokens concurrently that is suitable for
realistic authentication scenarios.
1.3 Paper Organization
Background and related work are provided in Section 2.
In Section 3, we elaborate on two TREVERSE instantiations
and then analyze their security. Section 4 statistically formal-
izes the TREVERSE authentication capability with respect to
both false rejection rate and false acceptance rate. Based on
public silicon PUF dataset, Section 5 experimentally eval-
uates authentication capability of both TREVERSE-A and
TREVERSE-B. In Section 6, two compatible authentication
capability augment methods are developed to assure the
TREVERSE authentication to be more practical and efficient.
In Section 7, we compare the TREVERSE authentication with
previous works, followed by conclusions in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Response Bit-Specific Reliability
The PUF response regeneration exhibits (slightly) errors
from query to query given the same challenge stimulated
to the same PUF instance, which is usually referred to as
PUF response unreliability. It has been noticed and experi-
mentally validated that the response error is non-uniform,
in other words, it is bit-specific [19], [25]–[27]. This is the
foundation of the TREVERSE. We next introduce how to
gain such response bit-specific reliability by the server dur-
ing the PUF provisioning phase with regard to three most
popular silicon PUFs: SRAM PUFs, ROPUFs, and LAPUFs.
2.1.1 SRAM PUF
The SRAM PUF exploits randomness but repeatable power-
up states of SRAM cells as responses; each cell consists of
two cross-coupled inverters, where the cell address is the
challenge [4]. Maes et al. first utilize the SRAM PUF response
bit-specific reliability, coined as soft decision helper data,
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Fig. 4. An arbiter PUF (APUF) circuit.
to realize an efficient key generator by lowering the min-
entropy loss of the helper data [25], [26], where the bit-
specific reliability is publicly known. To gain the bit-specific
reliability during the enrollment phase, multiple physical
measurements on the same SRAM PUF response is essential,
suggested number of measurements3 is in the order of 10 to
100 [25], [26]. Note that the key generation efficacy comes at
the cost of increased helper data size. In addition, integrity
of the helper data that is usually publicly saved off-chip
needs to be checked when it is loaded on-chip during
key reconstruction phase to prevent malicious helper data
manipulations [19].
2.1.2 ROPUF
The ROPUF produces a response upon comparing frequen-
cies of a pair of ring oscillators (ROs) designed identically
but varying in practice due to fabrication randomness. The
response bit-specific reliability is evaluated straightforward
by subtracting the frequencies of two ROs without reliance
on time-consuming multiple measurements. Such an easy-
to-acquire soft-decision helper data of the ROPUF has been
utilized to yield a higher coding gain for key generation [27].
2.1.3 Linear Additive PUF
One of the most popular PUF topology is the linear additive
PUF (LAPUF) [22]–[24]. Representatives of the LAPUF are:
APUF and k-sum ROPUF. The LAPUF is built upon linear
additive blocks to yield a very large number of CRPs given
limited area overhead.
APUF. The APUF, as illustrated in Fig. 4, has k stages
of two 2-input multiplexers, or any other units forming two
theoretically identical signal paths. To generate a response
bit, a pulse is applied to the first stage input, while the
challenge c determines the signal path to the next stage.
The input pulse will race through each multiplexer path
(top and bottom paths) in parallel against each other. At
the end of the APUF circuit, an arbiter, e.g., a latch or D-flip-
flop, determines whether the top or bottom signal arrives
first and reacts with a logic ‘0’ or ‘1’ accordingly. States
the other way, if the time delay difference tdif > 0, where
tdif = ttop − tbottom, response is ‘0’, vice versa, ‘1’.
k-sum ROPUF. The main difference between the APUF
and k-sum ROPUF is that each stage of the APUF is replaced
with a pair of ROs [22]–[24]. Instead of the delay time at each
stage is summed in the APUF, the frequency of RO at each
stage is summed. At the end of the k-sum ROPUF, there
is a comparator replacing the functionality of the arbiter of
the APUF. As generalized in Fig. 5, each k-sum ROPUF has
2 · k ROs. The challenge determines which RO at each stage
contributes to the top row, while the other one for bottom
row. Frequencies of the top and bottom rows are summed
and compared to generate a response [22]–[24].
3. Increasing the number of repeats to obtain a more accurate re-
sponse bit-specific reliability will further facilitate the TREVERSE au-
thentication, with trade-off of enrollment time.
RO0 RO2 RO2k-2
RO1 RO3 RO2k-1
+
+
+
+
+
+
c1 2 kc c
     sum
(top path)
       sum
(bottom path)
rcomp
Fig. 5. Generalized k-sum ROPUF circuit.
From the modeling perspective, the APUF and the k-sum
ROPUF are reduced to the same topology [24]. On one hand,
it has been widely shown that the LAPUF is vulnerable
to modeling attacks [17], [28]–[31]. On the other hand,
easy-to-learn of a basic LAPUF benefits PUF enrollment,
where response given any challenge is emulated on demand
through the LAPUF model to circumvent the difficulties of
managing a large CRP database [20], [24].
2.2 Modeling Attacks
The modeling attack realized by machine learning tech-
niques is regarded as the most vexing form of attacks on the
popular strong PUF candidate, in particular, the LAPUF [1],
[32]. In general, the modeling attack aims to obtain a learned
LAPUF model through training by using a small number
of collected CRPs. The obtained LAPUF model can predict
responses given not yet seen challenges with high accuracy,
thus, breaks the security—unpredictability—of the LAPUF.
Various countermeasures have been presented to increase
the complexity of modeling attacks including XOR-APUF,
Feedforward APUF, Lightweight Secure PUF [32], [33] and
Obfuscated PUFs [24], [34]. However, modeling attacks from
different research groups imply that all above countermea-
sures are insufficient [17], [28], [30], [31], [35].
2.3 Protect PUF Interface
It is clear that direct access to PUFs such as ROPUF and
SRAM PUF with limited CRP space, usually classified into
weak PUF category, should be prevented. Because responses
of weak PUF can be exhaustively readout within a short
time. While for the strong PUF such as LAPUF with a very
large CRP space that cannot be characterized within e.g.,
years. It is now recognized, at least highly recommended,
that an open LAPUF interface is hard to counteract various
modeling attacks [17], [19], [20], [31]. Thus, LAPUF interface
also needs to be protected to substantially improve the
LAPUF resilience to modeling attacks [19], [20]. Here, we
briefly describe two most related work: controlled PUF
(CPUF) [36], [37] and lockdown PUF [20].
2.3.1 Controlled PUF
The CPUF is a PUF that is equipped with a control logic
limiting the ways in which the PUF can be evaluated to
prevent adaptively challenge chosen attacks. As illustrated in
Fig. 6, the challenge is pre-processed while the response is
then post-processed, all via OWF. Before the OWF, the unre-
liable responses are required to be corrected. However, the
ECC logic and storing of helper data are always expensive.
In addition, the computed helper data needs to be stored
and carefully protected, otherwise, it poses the CPUF under
a potential threat—reliability-based modeling attacks [17],
[38]. If the helper data is stored off-chip that is usually the
case for CPUF, then helper data manipulation also needs to
5PUF
helper data
ECC
OWF OWFc e r
LFSR
CPUF
Fig. 6. Generalized controlled PUF (CPUF) construction.
be carefully addressed through, e.g., helper data integrity
check before loading it on-chip [15], [19]. However, this
induces more area and power overhead.
2.3.2 Lockdown PUF
The lockdown PUF restricts the maximum number of LA-
PUF CRPs that can be acquired by an adversary [20]. This
is achieved by an explicit CRP release. Generally, the token
and the server together determine challenges presented to
the LAPUF. Responses are divided into two subparts, the
first subpart needs to be firstly provided by the server. The
later subpart is visible only when the first subpart response
sent from the server is close enough to that generated by
the token. Thus, an adversary is unable to obtain new CRP
materials without authorization from the server. Once a
number of authentication rounds is reached, e.g., typically
1000 times [20], the token is disposed and never used
again. Such a technique, in essence, not intends to invent an
architecture to increase the complexity of modeling attacks by the
adversary. In the other way round, it limits the ability of
obtaining adequate CRPs for training by the adversary to
prevent modeling attacks.
2.4 Reverse Fuzzy Extractor
It is noticed that on-chip ECC decoder normally im-
plemented in token side is heavy, while the helper
data generation—ECC encoder—is much less resource-
consuming. Therefore, in [39], the decoder is constructively
placed on the resource-rich server side, while places the
encoder that computes the helper data on the token side.
We use the ‘reverse’ term to only refer to the exploitation
of a resource-rich server to perform authentications. Neither
ECC decoder nor encoder exists in the TREVERSE.
2.5 Trapdoor Computational Fuzzy Extractor
Herder et al. [40] propose the computationally-secure fuzzy
extractor to extract cryptographic keys from the PUF, while
the response reliability confidence information is treated as
a trapdoor to build up a stateless key generator. In other
words, the response reliability information is never exposed
but measured internally within the PUF key generator on
demand—discarded after internal usage. In this context, the
ROPUF is chosen for experimentally validations. Because
the ROPUF’s response reliability confidence that can be
directly acquired via subtracting frequencies of two ROs
meets with the trapdoor requirement. However, most PUF’s
response reliability confidence is hard to be directly and
easily measured on-chip. For instance, the APUF’s response
reliability is not measurable on-chip unless using expensive
peripheral circuits. Therefore, the stateless key generator
exploiting the trapdoor reliability information is not, or at
least difficult, applicable to other PUF structures.
Firstly, the TREVERSE does not require the token to
measure the response reliability, which is suitable for a
wide range of PUF types including LAPUFs, ROPUFs, and
SRAM PUFs—as long as the PUF has its corresponding
SimPUF. Secondly, in [40], the token has to take all the
computation burden to reconstruct a stateless key that is
targeted for key generation. Lightweight appears not the
concern. Conversely, TREVERSE aims at lightweight and
secure authentication by moving as much as computation
from the token to the server.
3 TREVERSE AUTHENTICATION: TWO INSTANTI-
ATIONS AND SECURITY ANALYSES
We develop two specific TREVERSE authentication instanti-
ations followed by analyzing their security. The first instan-
tiation, TREVERSE-A, is applicable to all PUFs: weak PUF
and strong PUF. The second instantiation, TREVERSE-B, is
tailored to fit the strong PUF, in particular, the LAPUF.
We first give notations and preliminaries.
3.1 Notations and Preliminaries
Binary vectors are denoted with a bold lowercase character,
e.g., challenge c and response e. Regenerated response from
the PUF during authentication is denoted with a tilde line,
e.g., e˜. All vectors are row vectors. A set is denoted with
calligraphic character, e.g., challenge set C and response set
E . Custom-defined procedure or function is printed in a
sans-serif font, e.g., Hamming distance HD(x,y).
We follow the definition on PUF in [7].
Definition 1. PUF: For a given manufacturing process, a
PUF is a manufactured building block that realizes a non-
deterministic mapping from a set C ∈ {0, 1}λ to a set
E ∈ {0, 1}η , where the distribution of each random variable
ei, with i ∈ [1, |C|], depends on process variations, noise,
environmental variables, and aging. Therefore, two random
evaluations of the response given the same challenge might
slightly vary but with an upper bound HD(e, e˜)≤ th, with
threshold th a constant.
The PUF cannot be physically cloned. Ideally, the PUF
should also show software unclonability. However, it ap-
pears that software unclonability is hard to meet without
protecting the PUF interface properly, especially, to those sil-
icon PUFs. For example, LAPUF are vulnerable to modeling
attacks where a software copy can be learned. As for ROPUF
and SRAM PUF, their limited CRP can be exhaustively
readout to create a software copy 4. We refer those PUFs that
can be emulated through a software copy to as simulatable
PUFs.
4. The response of weak PUF is usually independently produced,
therefore, the weak PUF is resilient to the modeling attacks through
machine learning technique. However, this does not mean that the
weak PUF cannot be modeled.
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Fig. 7. Overview of TREVERSE-A instantiation that is generic to all PUF
types. Note that an extra on-chip TRNG is only required on the condition
that the PUF response is dependent on each other, for example, in
the LAPUF case. If the PUF is such as ROPUF and SRAM PUF that
responses are generated independently, the TRNG can be removed,
where the server sends a nonce during authentication.
Definition 2. Simulatable PUF: 5 If a PUF has a parameter-
ized model SimPUF that is capable of computing a response
e˜ and its corresponding reliability confidence conf through
(e˜, c˜onf)←SimPUF(c). The e˜ is indistinguishable from the
response e—P(e˜ = e) is -close to 1. The c˜onf is also -close
to conf , where (e, conf) ←PUF(c). We call such a PUF is
the simulatable PUF and its corresponding parameterized
model is SimPUF.
Here, we would like to draw one’s attention that the fun-
damental difference between the Simulatable PUF definition
and the PUF definition is whether the bit-specific reliability
information is concerned or not. In addition, the simulatable
PUF is efficiently software clonable to gain SimPUF.
Definition 3. One-Way Function A function f is one-way
if and only if OWF can be computed by a polynomial time
algorithm, but any polynomial time randomized OWF− that
attempts to computing a pseduo-inverse for OWF succeeds
with negligible probability.
3.2 Gain SimPUF
Corresponding to Section 2.1, we specific the way of gaining
SimPUF for LAPUF, ROPUF and SRAM PUF during the
provisioning phase.
1) The LAPUF can be accurately modeled [28] via machine
learning given a small collection of CRPs. The learned
LAPUF model can accurately predict the response
given a random challenge and assess the response’s bit-
specific reliability. Thus, the learned LAPUF model is
actually the SimPUF.
2) The server measures and saves all ROs’ frequency,
which is treated as the SimPUF of ROPUF. The pair-
wised comparison of two chosen ROs’ frequency gives
the response, while the frequency subtraction of these
two chosen ROs is the bit-specific reliability.
3) As for the SRAM PUF, its response can be exhaus-
tively readout, whereas the bit-specific reliability can
be obtained via repeated evaluations given the same
response. Therefore, its SimPUF is acquired.
3.3 TREVERSE-A
Overview of TREVERSE-A is shown in Fig. 7. The PUF
can be weak PUF and strong PUF. Thus, it is a generic
5. We are aware that the Simulatable PUF term was previously used
by Ruhrmair et. al in 2013 [41]. However, the definition is quite different
from us. In general, the Simulatable PUF in [41] only requires to
emulate the response accurately, it has no requirements on the bit-
specific reliability evaluation.
LAPUF
c e rLFSR
TREVERSE-B
OWF OWFs
Fig. 8. TREVERSE-B instantiation that is extremely suitable for the
LAPUF—a typical representative of strong PUF.
instantiation. The PUF teams with the OWF, while the extra
on-chip TRNG is only required when the PUF response is
not independent to each other, for example, in the LA-
PUF case. If the PUF is such as ROPUF and SRAM PUF
that responses are produced independently, the TRNG is
not needed, where the server sends a nonce to the token
during authentication. The r˜ as a function of both e˜ and
the nonce—r˜=OWF(˜r, nonce)—is sent to the server publicly.
The TREVERSE-A, from the token side, is on par with the
authentication baseline, see Fig. 3, where the digital key
is encrypted to avoid exposure and the public nonce is
exploited to avoid replaying attacks.
3.4 TREVERSE-B
Unlike the TREVERSE-A, the TREVERSE-B depicted in
Fig. 8 is tailored for the LAPUF. The TREVERSE-B instan-
tiation only teams with the OWF—noting that one OWF
logic implementation can be dual used by the pre- and post-
OWF. The r˜ is solely a function of the regenerated e˜, where
r˜=OWF(e˜)6. The TREVERSE-A even removes the nonce that
is a must in the authentication baseline (cf. Fig. 3).
3.5 Security Analysis
3.5.1 Adversary Model
The adversary model [20], [28], [30], [34] is always con-
sidered to evaluate the PUF security, which we adopt to
evaluate security of TREVERSE. It is assumed that SimPUF
enrolment is performed by the server in a secure environ-
ment and prohibited afterwards. An adversary is allowed
to eavesdrop on the communication channel and arbitrarily
apply challenges via the publicly accessible TREVERSE-A
and TREVERSE-B interface to observe r˜. In addition, the
adversary can observe and manipulate the nonce in the
TREVERSE-B. Same to previous work [20], [28], [30], [34],
this work focuses on common attacks including brute-force
attacks, replaying attacks, and especially modeling attacks.
Although we do not specifically targeting to resolve the
following attacks, we show their existential countermea-
sures with which TREVERSE is fully compatible. In compar-
ison with digitally stored key, the PUF has higher tamper
resistance to the invasive attack. If the attacker intends to
delayer the IC and probing internal PUF secrecy, to a large
extent, he will alter the PUF CRP behavior or even destroy
it once the PUF layout is carefully handled, one example
is the controlled strong PUF (cf. Section 2.3.1). The other
example is the capacitive PUF [42]. For the hybrid attacks
combining timing and power side channel information with
6. To be precise, r˜=OWF(e˜, OWF(cs). As the term of OWF(cs) does
not affect the authentication capability and security analysis, we re-
move it here from main text for simplicity.
7machine learning, this usually requires on-chip peripheral
circuits [43] to measure side channel information. However,
those circuits appear not available in the resource-constraint
devices. In addition, these attacks can be eliminated through
careful circuit design techniques, e.g., dynamic and differ-
ential CMOS logic [43]. The other photonic side channel
information attack [44] requires laboratory equipments and
professional skills, it can also be eliminated via circuit de-
sign techniques, e.g., interconnect meshes [45].
3.5.2 Brute-force Attacks
An adversary can perform brute-force attacks. The adver-
sary has two options: i) guessing e˜; ii) guessing r˜. The
adversary may tend to choose the former. Because the
adversary does not need to consider the m-bit unreliable
bits when guessing the former. The probability of correctly
guessing a response e˜ is expressed as:
P = (max{τ, 1− τ})n−m (1)
where the τ is the response bias to be ‘1’/‘0’. Brute-force
attacks are extremely unlike to succeed. For example, when
n = 64 and setting m = 12, assuming that the response
has a severely bias of 0.65—‘1’ probability, the P is 1.87 ×
10−10 < 10−9. Notably, modern PUFs usually have low bias
where the τ is normally close to 0.5 [21].
3.5.3 Replaying Attacks
In the TREVERSE-A, the nonce is dynamically refreshed for
each authentication round when the same cs is applied.
In the TREVERSE-B case, each challenge seed cs is only
employed once for each authentication round as the LAPUF
has a very large CRP pool. Thus, replaying attacks are halted
for both TREVERSE-A and TREVERSE-B.
3.5.4 Modeling Attacks: TREVERSE-A
Reminding that TREVERSE-A is a generic design to both
weak PUF and strong PUFs. When the weak PUFs such
as ROPUFs and SRAM PUFs are exploited, these PUFs are
inherently immune to modeling attacks. Because their CRPs
are independent.
When the LAPUF is deployed in the TREVERSE-A,
conventional modeling attacks in [28], [30] requiring a col-
lection of CRPs is prevented because of the OWF impeding
direct observation of the response e. As for the reliability-
based modeling attack, generally, an attacker has to know
each response’s reliability information. Notably, determina-
tion of a response’s reliability requires repeatedly measure-
ments. The on-chip TRNG prevents multiple observations
on the responses given the same challenge. Therefore, the
reliability-based modeling attack is halted—this shall be
more clear after going through Section 3.5.5. Overall, all
presently known modeling attacks are prevented.
3.5.5 Modeling Attacks: TREVERSE-B
The TREVERSE-B, to a large degree, can be viewed as a
cut-down CPUF without ECC logic, see Fig. 6 and Fig. 8
for a comparison. The CPUF provides reinforcement against
conventional modeling attacks exploiting such as support
vector machine (SVM) and logistic regression (LR) machine
learning algorithms [28], [30] attributing to the OWF [19].
The TREVERSE-B inherits all the modeling attack resilience
from the CPUF. Thus, TREVERSE-B is also resilient to con-
ventional modeling attacks. We focus on, and thus analyze,
the TREVERSE-B resilience to the recent revealed reliability
based modeling attacks that exploit the noise side-channel
information, where a direct relationship between a challenge
and a response is not a must [17]. The adversary’s target is
to gain response reliability information.
It was analyzed in a recent study [19] that the CPUF
is overprotected against PUF modeling attacks, where the
succeeding OWF already provides a full protection and the
preceding OWF is unnecessary. We stress that the preced-
ing OWF is a must not only for the CPUF but also for
the TREVERSE-B, in particular, to against reliability based
modeling attacks [17].
We firstly remind the reader to recall that the LFSR is
used to sequentially concatenate a n-bit response. Supposing
that the preceding OWF is removed, the challenge seed cs
can be directly applied to the LFSR. Then, the adversary
has a chance to gain reliability information given certain
challenges. In addition, one should note that the adversary
is able to precisely control the PUF’s working condition, for
instances, supply voltage and temperature when a challenge
seed cs is repeatedly queried to perform multiple measure-
ments. Given a n-bit response, the probability of discovering
a cs that ensures all n bits exhibiting no error is:
Prel = (1− )n (2)
with  the average response error rate.
Under a precisely controlled operating condition, the
 is very small, which leads to a non-negligible Prel. For
example, experimental results in [21] report that the  for
APUF is 3.56% under a well controlled operating condition,
which leads to Prel being 0.0097 with n = 128. Once a
cs1 gives sub-challenges c(11), ..., c(1n) that are all reliable
challenges. Repeatedly applying cs1 presents the same r˜1.
Then, the adversary is able to find the other challenge seed
cs2 giving sub-challenges c(21), c(11)..., c(1(n−1)). Repeat-
edly applying cs2 to the TREVERSE-B gives the adversary
reliability information of c(21). To be precise, if r˜2 is constant
under multiple measurements, c(21) is a reliable challenge.
Otherwise, c(21) is an unreliable challenge. Once reliability
of a collection of challenges is exposed, reliability based
modeling attacks become feasible. The preceding OWF
prevents the adversary judiciously determining cs2 that
leads to c(21), c(11)..., c(1(n−1)). In other words, adaptively
challenge-chosen attacks are prohibited [1]. Eventually, the
reliability information is oblivious to an attacker. As a con-
sequence, reliability based modeling attacks are prevented
attributing to the infeasibility of gaining reliability informa-
tion given a challenge.
To this end, the TREVERSE-B is shown to be resilient to
all presently known modeling attacks.
4 FORMALIZING AUTHENTICATION CAPABILITY
This section formalizes the false acceptance rate (FAR) and
false rejection rate (FRR) of the TREVERSE authentication.
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Fig. 9. The blue curve is the reliability confidence distribution of different
response bits. Ideally, it follows normal distribution of N ∼ (0, σINTER).
The dashed green curve is the confidence distribution of the same
response bit under different evaluations. It follows normal distribution
of N ∼ (conf, σINTRA).
4.1 False Acceptance Rate
The TREVERSE authentication has zero tolerance on errors
occurred within the server deemed n−m reliable response
bits, e˜indexm+1 , ..., e˜indexn attributing to the OWF. Remind-
ing that the server takes a strict acceptance criterion of
e˜indexm+1 = eindexm+1 , ..., e˜indexn = eindexn . Thus, given m
and n, the FAR is expressed as:
FAR = (max{τ, 1− τ})n−m (3)
the τ is the response bias. Actually, the FAR is same to
the brute-force attack success probability in Eq (1), which
is extremely small in practice.
4.2 False Rejection Rate
Formalization of FRR requires an accurate PUF reliability
model that capture precise bit-specific reliability, we use
such a model following [25], [40], [46].
We consider CONFi as random variables that are the
response reliability confidence of the ith response bit ei
measured in the enrollment phase. Similarly, C˜ONFi are
random variables that are the remeasured response bit con-
fidence of the ith response bit e˜i during the regeneration
phase. It has been shown that CONFi and C˜ONFi follow
the same normal distribution of N ∼ (µINTER, σINTER)—
in Fig. 9, (µINTER) = 0 is illustrated for simplicity [40].
As CONFi and C˜ONFi are measured from the same re-
sponse bit during the enrollment phase and regeneration
phase respectively. Therefore, the conditional distribution
of Pr(CONFi|C˜ONFi = conf) is much narrower, which
follows normal distribution of N ∼ (conf, σINTRA) as
shown in Fig 9. The mean value is conf that is a measured
confidence value and the variance is σINTRA.
It is recognized that CONFi and C˜ONFi are correspond-
ing to the same response bit, thereby, their distribution
are same. More specifically, ∀conf , Pr(CONFi|C˜ONFi =
conf) = Pr(C˜ONFi|CONFi = conf). This is important,
because now we are able to use the confidence information
enrolled in the enrollment phase to reason about the error
probability of a reevaluated given response bit.
Following [25], we say that e˜i = 1 if CONFi < 0 and
e˜i = 0 if CONFi > 0 (using e˜i = 0 if CONFi > 0 and
e˜i = 1 if CONFi < 0 will give same results at the end), we
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Fig. 10. Plot of CDFperr(x) in Eq(10) as a function of error probability x.
define the one-probability that is the probability of being
one under a reevaluation j for response ei as:
pe˜i = Pr(e˜
(j)
i = 1) (4)
By considering Pr(CONFi|C˜ONFi = conf) that follows
N ∼ (conf, σINTRA), the Eq(4) is expressed as:
pe˜i = Φ
( −conf
σINTRA
)
, (5)
with Φ the standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF). The pe˜i of a given response is a sample from
variable Pe˜ by considering all bits. The CDF of Pe˜ can be
derived as:
CDFpe˜(x) =Pr(Pe˜ ≤ x)
=Pr
(
Φ
( −conf
σINTRA
) ≤ x) = Φ(λ1Φ−1(x) + λ2),
(6)
with λ1 = σINTRAσINTER and λ2 =
µINTER
σINTER
.
Next, we are able to find response error distribution
based on the one-probability. Firstly, following [25], we
define the correct enrolled response eCi .
eCi = argmax
e∈{0,1}
{
Pr
j
(eji = e)
}
, (7)
If the pei < 1/2, then it gives e
C
i = 0. Otherwise, if the
pei > 1/2, then it gives e
C
i = 1.
Now, the error probability given a bit e˜i can be defined:
perri = Pr
j
(e˜ji 6= eCi ). (8)
Plugging Eq(7) into Eq(8), the p ˜erri is given:
perri = min{pe˜i , 1− pe˜i}. (9)
The perri given response e˜i is sampled from variable Perri
when considering all the response bits. Now the CDF of
Perri can be given:
CDFperr(x) =Pr(Perr ≤ x)
=CDFpe˜(x) + 1− CDFpe˜(1− x)
=Φ(λ1Φ
−1(x) + λ2) + 1− Φ(λ1Φ−1(1− x) + λ2).
(10)
To ease the following understanding, we use an example to
describe what CDFperr(x) stands for in a general way. The
Fig. 107 shows the CDFperr(x) as a function of x. In general,
there are CDFperr(x) percentage of response bits satisfying
that their error probabilities are below x. For example, more
than 10% responses’ error probability is less than 10−7.
7. Here, λ1 = 0.3231 and λ2 = −0.3477, we will see that these values
are drawn from real measurements from the ROPUF in Table. 1.
9Now we can think the above description in the other
way around. We say a response bit ei is a reliable response
bit when its error probability perri ≤ x. Then the probability
of e˜i being stable is actually CDFperr(x) [40]. By keeping
this in mind in the following, we now start deriving the
FRR.
The number of errors in an n-bit response is no longer
following binomial distribution but Poisson-binomial distri-
bution [46]. Given n response bits, their error probabilities
perr = (perr1 , ..., perrn) can be randomly sampled given the
CDFperr(x) by using inverse transform sampling8 [46]. We
then sort perr in a descending manner and obtain pSerr.
Next, we exclude the first m elements in pSerr—this equals to
that TREVERSE authentication tolerates m bits with lowest
reliability confidence—to get pS(n−m)err with length of n−m.
The rest n − m bits have an error probability vector of
p
S(n−m)
err . The FRR is given as:
FRR = 1− FPB(0;pS(n−m)err ), (11)
with FPB(t;p
S(n−m)
err ) the Poisson-binomial CDF [46]. The
t=0 means that the remaining n − m bits exhibit no error.
Noting that the FRR is not analytically given. In practice,
randomly sampling a large number of n-bit responses, re-
peatedly evaluating the corresponding Eq(11), and use the
mean of FRR of those evaluations is adopted.
To this end, given σINTER, σINTRA, µINTER—these three
determine λ1 and λ2—and application determinedm and n,
one can accurately estimate the FRR according to the PUF’s
operating range. As we shall see in Section 5, λ1 and λ2 can
be determined conveniently during the enrollment phase.
5 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
We validate the efficacy and practicality of the devised two
TREVERSE instantiations: TREVERSE-A and TREVERSE-B.
To validate TREVERSE-A, we use ROPUF that is a weak
PUF. To validate TREVERSE-B, we use one representative of
LAPUF: k-sum ROPUF.
5.1 TREVERSE-A
5.1.1 ROPUF Dataset Description
We use Virginia Tech’s public ROPUF dataset for validation,
in this dataset, five ROPUFs are implemented across five
Spartan3E S500 FPGA boards. Each FPGA implements one
ROPUF that consists of 512 ROs. Details are referred to [47].
The dataset contains each RO’s frequency measurements.
Each RO’s frequency is measured 100 times under 0.96 V,
1.08 V, 1.20 V, 1.32 V, 1.44 V, respectively, at a fixed temper-
ature of 25◦C to reflect supply voltage influence. Similarly,
each RO’s frequency is also evaluated 100 times under 35◦C,
45◦C, 55◦C, 65◦C, respectively, with a fixed supply voltage
of 1.20 V, to reflect influence from temperature changes.
8. The inverse transform sampling requires an inverse function of the
CDFperr(x), which cannot be easily derived. It is recognized that an
alternative is using data interpolation method. The default function in
MATLAB 2012b is interpl command.
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Fig. 11. Measured σINTRA and σINTER. The shown σINTRA = 0.81 is
evaluated under the worst-corner (0.96 V, 25◦C). While the σINTER =
2.2 is evaluated under nominal operating condition of (1.20 V, 25◦C).
TABLE 1
λ1 and  measured under different operating conditions and the λ2.
Operating condition  λ1 λ2
(25◦C, 0.96 V) 9.66% 0.3672 -0.3477
(25◦C, 1.08 V) 4.68% 0.1933 -0.3477
(25◦C, 1.20 V) 0.98% 0.0239 -0.3477
(35◦C, 1.20 V) 1.82% 0.0728 -0.3477
(45◦C, 1.20 V) 1.88% 0.0700 -0.3477
(55◦C, 1.20 V) 2.08% 0.0795 -0.3477
(65◦C, 1.20 V) 2.17% 0.0870 -0.3477
(25◦C, 1.32 V) 4.70% 0.2151 -0.3477
(25◦C, 1.44 V) 6.42% 0.3231 -0.3477
5.1.2 Extraction of λ1 and λ2
There are
(512
2
)
= 130816 possible combinations to select
a pair of ROs out of 512 ROs in one ROPUF 9. Therefore,
one ROPUF yields 130816 CRPs. The reliability of all five
ROPUFs are evaluated. Worst unreliability will result in
worst FRR, thus, we are interested in the ROPUF instance
that exhibits the worst BER or , which is summarized in Ta-
ble. 1 (second column) under varying operating conditions.
The BER is predominately influenced by the supply voltage,
which is in well agreement with other reports [47].
The reliability confidence of the ROPUF is the frequency
subtraction of the pairwise ROs. For all 130816 response bits,
distribution of frequency subtraction of these response bits
are evaluated under different operating conditions. Same
to the observation in [40]. the mean and variance of the
distribution changes only slightly under differing operating
conditions. Thus, the µINTER and σINTER measured under
the nominal operating condition is used, as shown in Fig. 11.
Notably, the µINTER is not ideally equal to 0 that thereby in-
duces a severely bias, in particular, response ‘1’ to be 36.65%.
To measure σINTRA and µINTRA, the frequency subtraction
given all response bits are measured under the nominal
operating condition treated as a reference, then frequency
subtraction given all response bits are measured again under
a deviating operating condition. The change between these
two measurements, CONFi − C˜ONFi, is assessed. The dis-
tribution is recognized as Pr(CONFi − C˜ONFi) [40]. The
standard deviation is the σINTRA. In Fig. 11 the σINTRA
evaluated under the worst-corner of (0.96 V, 25◦C) is shown.
Table. 1 lists λ1 = σINTRAσINTER evaluated under different operat-
ing conditions and λ2 =
µINTER
σINTER
.
9. Note that we can use each RO only once to extract a 256-bit
response to make the response generation independent. The reason of
not doing so here is to facilitate the experimental demonstration with a
large CRP sample.
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TABLE 2
FRR of the ROPUF under different operating conditions and m
settings, where n = 64.
25◦C, 0.96 V 25◦C, 1.08 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.32 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m FRR FRR FRR FRR FRR
12 85.12%; 90.11% 21.23%; 37.21% 1.04%; 4.95% 20.57%; 46.16% 48.95%; 83.48%
14 77.72%; 84.23% 13.69%; 25.98% 0.37%; 4.08% 12.78%; 34.63% 37.30%; 75.10%
16 69.35%; 77.89% 8.12%; 17.09% 0.14%; 3.52% 7.41%; 25.71% 26.97%; 66.32%
18 60.11%; 69.80% 4.68%; 10.78% 0.03%; 3.19% 4.12%; 17.08% 18.08%; 56.87%
20 50.64%; 61.17% 2.43%; 6.36% 0.01%; 2.89% 2.23%; 11.04% 11.53%; 46.36%
22 41.02%; 51.01% 1.29%; 3.93% 0.01%; 2.59% 1.13%; 7.06% 7.26%; 37.05%
24 32.08%; 43.10% 0.63%; 2.05% 0%; 2.33% 0.54%; 4.07% 4.21%; 29.38%
26 24.75%; 33.93% 0.23%; 1.27% 0%; 2.10% 0.28%; 2.58% 2.20%; 20.93%
The FRR from empirical evaluations and FRR statistical analyses
based on Eq(11) are listed for comparison, where the format is
(empirical; statistical).
5.1.3 Results
Empirical and statistical results of FRR are shown in Table 2.
They agree well. The FRR decreases as the m increases. In
addition, the FRR is minimizing when the e˜ is regenerated
under an operating condition that is close to the nominal
operating condition. For example, the FRR is 1.04% when
the e˜ is evaluated under the (65◦C, 1.20 V) operating corner
during authentication with m = 12. In contrast, the FRR
goes up to 24.75% even with m = 26 when the e˜ is
reproduced under a greatly deviated operating corner of
(25◦C, 0.96 V) that has a −20% voltage variation10.
One may note that the statistical results shows a con-
servative assessment of the FRR in comparison with the
empirical results. The reason is that the response has a
severely bias, response ‘1’ to be 36.65%, in this ROPUF case.
In other words, Pr(CONFi) in Fig. 2 not follows a normal
distribution with mean value of zero—µINTER deviates from
zero, which explains the conservative assessments [40].
5.2 TREVERSE-B
We use the k-sum ROPUF as a representative of the LAPUF
to validate the TREVERSE-B.
5.2.1 LAPUF dataset description
Frequency measurements of all ROs, described in Sec-
tion 5.1.1, are leveraged to form k-sum ROPUF. We eval-
uated five k-sum ROPUFs; each of them is constructed in
one FPGA board by using 128 ROs—k = 64. The frequency
summation and consequent comparison are post-processed
using MATLAB. Among five evaluated k-sum ROPUFs, the
most noisy k-sum ROPUFs with worst-case BER of 14.53%
occurred at (0.96 V, 25◦C) is most interested, while the
(1.20 V, 25◦C) acts as the nominal operating corner. Later
on, we call the k-sum ROPUF as LAPUF for convenience.
5.2.2 Extraction of λ1 and λ2 from LAPUF model
The reliability confidence information of the LAPUF is pre-
dicted by the LAPUF model that serves as SimPUF. We use
10,000 challenges to extract λ1 and λ2.
The reliability confidence of the response bit of the
LAPUF is the frequency subtraction (difference) between
the top and bottom RO rows. By predicting frequency dif-
ferences given all response bits through the LAPUF model
10. As a remark here, the reader would expect that (65◦C, 0.96 V)
would be the worst corner. But the FRR under this corner is not shown.
This is because the (65◦C, 0.96 V) corner data is unavailable from the
public data set.
TABLE 3
λ1 and  of the LAPUF under different operating conditions and the λ2.
Operating condition  λ1 λ2
(25◦C, 0.96 V) 14.53% 0.4477 -0.0036
(25◦C, 1.08 V) 7.09% 0.2262 -0.0036
(65◦C, 1.20 V) 3.44% 0.1010 -0.0036
(25◦C, 1.32 V) 6.59% 0.1991 -0.0036
(25◦C, 1.44 V) 8.81% 0.2739 -0.0036
TABLE 4
FRR of the LAPUF under different operating conditions and m settings,
where n = 64.
25◦C, 0.96 V 25◦C, 1.08 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.32 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m FRR FRR FRR FRR FRR
12 98.73%; 98.00% 59.59%; 56.87% 6.02%; 6.21% 44.31%; 39.21% 75.20%; 73.37%
14 97.55%; 96.37% 48.38%; 45.14% 2.60%; 3.72% 32.42%; 30.10% 65.82%; 62.74%
16 95.57%; 93.83% 36.98%; 34.97% 1.03%; 2.63% 22.73%; 20.50% 55.72%; 52.83%
18 93.16%; 90.37% 27.01%; 26.02% 0.51%; 2.08% 15.10%; 14.32% 45.56%; 42.71%
20 89.56%; 85.35% 19.06%; 17.37% 0.19%; 1.81% 9.33%; 8.42% 34.95%; 33.56%
22 84.79%; 80.29% 12.64%; 12.52% 0.05%; 1.62% 5.49%; 5.09% 26.21%; 24.52%
24 79.25%; 72.50% 8.17%; 7.57% 0.05%; 1.44% 3.07%; 2.89% 18.80%; 17.74%
26 72.50%; 66.00% 4.85%; 4.82% 0.02%; 1.29% 1.64%; 1.69% 13.14%; 12.28%
The FRR format is same with that of Table 2.
under the nominal operating condition and plotting all
frequency differences, the standard variance is recognized
as σINTER and the mean is the µINTER.
To extract σINTRA, the frequency differences given all
response bits are predicted by the LAPUF model trained by
CRPs evaluated under the nominal condition as a reference,
then frequency differences for all the same response bits
are predicted again by the LAPUF model trained with
CRPs evaluated under a differing operating condition. The
change between these two evaluations, CONFi − C˜ONFi,
is calculated. By plotting 10,000 frequency changes, the
Pr(CONFi − C˜ONFi) distribution is obtained. Then its
standard deviation is recognized as the σINTRA and the
mean is µINTRA. Once the σINTER, µINTER and σINTRA
are acquired, the λ1 and λ2 can be directly determined.
In Table 3, λ1 and  evaluated under different operating
conditions and the λ2 are summarized.
5.2.3 Results
Empirically and statistically evaluated FRR of the LAPUF
are shown in Table 4 respectively. Instead of that the em-
pirical FRR is always smaller than the statistical FRR as for
the ROPUF in Table 2, they almost perfectly agree with each
other in the LAPUF results here. Recall that the conservative
statistical FRR for ROPUF is induced by the severely re-
sponse bias of the ROPUF that is 36.65%, while the response
bias of the investigated LAPUF is 50.05%. Therefore, the
statistical FRR is accurately reflects the empirical FRR even
though the statistical FRR evaluation of the LAPUF is built upon
learned LAPUF models.
5.3 Remarks
5.3.1 Easy extraction of λ1 and λ2
To accurately assess the FRR, two crucial parameters λ1
and λ2 (as function of σINTER, σINTRA, µINTER, with
λ1 =
σINTRA
σINTER
and λ2 =
µINTER
σINTER
) are required. As we
have experimentally showcased, determination of σINTER,
σINTRA, µINTER is not difficult and only a one-time task for
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the server at the PUF provisioning phase. To be precise, it is
just enrolling two SimPUFs given the same PUF but under
two operating conditions—one under nominal operating
condition, the other under (expected) worse-case operating
corner.
5.3.2 Recommend TREVERSE-B
We recommend the TREVERSE-B tailored for LAPUF given
the following facts:
1) There is no need of the nonce.
2) The SimPUF of the LAPUF is obtained through ma-
chine learning instead of exhaustive physical measure-
ments (cf. Section 2.1).
3) The LAPUF structure is compact and lightweight with
regarding to area and power consumption, in particu-
lar, when deploying the APUF.
6 AUGMENT AUTHENTICATION CAPABILITY
It is paramount to set a small m from the practicability
perspective. Because m stands for the computation over-
head to the server. The smaller m, less computation for the
server to authenticate a single token, which in turn assures
authenticating more tokens concurrently by the server. In
this section, we present two simple, efficient and compatible
methods to substantially reduce the FRR but only having
negligible increasement on the FAR when setting a small m.
6.1 d-Authentication
The first method is d-authentication. In one authentication
session, the server issues d challenge seeds cs1, ..., csd. The
token sequentially returns d outputs r˜1, ..., r˜d. The server
performs authentication to each received output sequentially.
Authentication succeeds once a received output is accepted
and then the server stops checking the rest. Consequently,
this authentication session successfully completes. If none of
d received outputs can pass the authentication, then this au-
thentication session is rejected. The FRR of d-authentication,
FRRd, is given as:
FRRd = FRR
d (12)
Detailed results of FRRd of ROPUF and LAPUF can be
found in Appendix.
As for the FARd, it is expressed as:
FARd = d× FAR. (13)
We can see that d-authentication only linearly increases FAR
while exponentially minimizes FRR. Therefore, the FARd is
still extremely small. For example, taking the ROPUF case
that has severe response bias of 36.65% as an example, the
FARd is still less than 10−9 when setting n = 64, m = 12
and d = 10.
6.2 Multiple-Reference
The second method explores multiple referenced responses
to enhance the authentication capability. Overall, at the
provisioning phase, multiple responses eref and their cor-
responding conf ref under discrete operating corners subject
to the same challenges applied to the same PUF are enrolled.
In other words, instead of enrolling one SimPUF under
only one operating condition—nominal condition, multiple
SimPUFs are enrolled under discrete operating corners.
Taking ROPUF as an example to ease understanding,
during the enrollment phase, the frequencies of all ROs
are measured under two operating corners: (25◦C, 1.08 V)
and (25◦C, 1.32 V). As a consequence, the eref1 , eref2 and
their corresponding conf ref1 , conf ref2 are obtained, where
ref1 and ref2 are operating corners of (25◦C,1.08 V) and
(25◦C,1.32 V), respectively. During the authentication, for
each received r˜, TREVERSE authentication is performed on
r˜ based on both eref1 , eref2 at the same time. If any one
of two TREVERSE authentications passes—r˜ = rref1 or
r˜ = rref2 , the authentication succeeds. This helps decreasing
the FRR significantly. The FRR when multiple-reference is
utilized, hence termed as FRRmr, is formalized as:
FRRmr =
M∏
i=1
FRRrefi (14)
with FRRrefi is the FRR when a single referenced operating
corner is used for TREVERSE authentication. M is the
number of referenced operating corners enrolled.
Detailed results of FRRmr of ROPUF and LAPUF can be
found in Appendix.
As for the FARmr , again, it is only linearly increased and
is expressed as:
FARmr = FRR×M (15)
6.3 Merging d-Authentication and Multiple-Reference
The above two authentication augment methods are com-
patible with each other. When both methods are imple-
mented together, the FRR and FAR are termed as FRRMd
and FARMd and expressed as:
FRRMd = (
M∏
i=1
FRRrefi)
d. (16)
FARMd = FAR×M × d. (17)
The M stands for the number of referenced responses
and the d is the number of authentication rounds used
during one authentication session. The FRRrefi is referred
back to Eq(11) and the FAR to Eq(3).
Both ROPUF (TREVERSE-A) and LAPUF (TREVERSE-
B) are extensively tested, see results in Table 5 and Table 6,
where two references are employed (M = 2) and d = 10.
In this context, tens of thousands of error-and-trials com-
putation burden is negligible by the resource-rich server,
thereby, enabling a large number of PUF embedded tokens
to be authenticated at the same time.
Notably, in our experimental validations, we only use two-
reference while there is no difficult for using more references by the
server to further significantly reduce the FRR, which will make the
error-and-trials computation burden even lower. One also please
note that using more references brings no overhead to the token.
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TABLE 5
FRRMd of the ROPUF under different operating conditions and
m = 8, 10, 12, 14 settings, where n = 64 and d = 10 with two
references (25◦C, 1.08 V) and (25◦C, 1.32 V).
25◦C, 0.96 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m FRRMd FRRMd FRRMd
8 0.10%; 2.46% 0%; 0.10% 0%; 8.24×10−8
10 0%; 0.20% 0%; 2.18×10−5 0%; < 10−9
12 0%; 1.52×10−4 0%; 1.95×10−7 0%; < 10−9
14 0%; 6.48×10−6 0%; < 10−9 0%; < 10−9
The FRRMd based on empirical evaluations and statistical analyses
based on Eq(16) are listed for comparison. The format is (empiri-
cal;statistical).
TABLE 6
FRRMd of the LAPUF under different operating conditions and
m = 8, 10, 12, 14 settings, where n = 64 and d = 10 with two
references (25◦C, 1.08 V) and (25◦C, 1.32 V).
25◦C, 0.96 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m FRRMd FRRMd FRRMd
8 15.80%; 14.02% 0.20%; 2.08×10−4 0%; 2.33×10−9
10 4.60%; 4.15% 0%; 3.57×10−6 0%; < 10−9
12 0.60%; 0.74% 0%; 2.11×10−8 0%; < 10−9
14 0%; 0.08% 0%; < 10−9 0%; < 10−9
The FRRMd formation is same to that of Table 5.
7 DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON
According to the recent survey on nineteen PUF-based
lightweight authentication protocols [19], only six protocols
are left that are robust against noisy PUF response and
modeling attacks. All these six protocols fall into the form
of PUF-based key generations. The regenerated response
errors need to be corrected to derive a key. Then the key
is used for authentication. Except reverse fuzzy extractor
based authentication [39], all other protocols require an on-
chip ECC decoder. However, the reverse fuzzy extractor
still requires an on-chip ECC encoder, though it consumes
less overhead than the decoder. For all six protocols, public
known helper data is a must to assist the error correction.
Our presented TREVERSE authentication removes ECC
logic as well as helper data 11.
7.1 Lightweight and Security
7.1.1 Lightweight
We evaluate the lightweight from both hardware and soft-
ware implementation overhead.
Hardware Overhead: As highlighted in Section Introduc-
tion, a referenced fully implemented PUF-based key gen-
erator on FPGA platform [14] resorts to concatenate of a
(7, 1, 3) repetition code and a BCH(318, 174, 17) code for
error correction costing 112 and 37 FPGA slices, respectively.
In contrast, a hash implementation—SPONGENT-128 only
consumes 22 slices.
Software Overhead: We also tested error correction and
hash overhead based on software implementation on the
microcontroller embedded within a computational RFID
(CRFID) transponder. The overhead is assessed by required
11. Strictly, we do not need any helper data unless one insists to call
the enrolled SimPUF as helper data. We stress that for all PUF-based
applications, the PUF enrollment is always a must.
number of clock cycles. Based on our tests, the BLAKE2s-128
hash function only costs 104,732 clock cycles, while a single
BCH(255,21,55) code decoding block consumes 8,345,992
clock cycles. If BCH(255,21,55) blocks are chosen to gain a
128-bit security level, the total error correction overhead will
be up to 50,075,952 clock cycles—six blocks required in total.
The above experimental overhead evaluation based on
both hardware implementation [14] and software imple-
mentation explicitly affirms that, in practice, hash function over-
head is significantly less than that of error correction. Therefore,
discarding the expensive ECC logic assures the TREVERSE
authentication to be very lightweight.
7.1.2 Security
For the CPUF and the reverse fuzzy extractor using LAPUF,
the helper data poses them under the threaten of reliability-
based modeling attacks due to that the information leakage
through helper data is exploitable to discover response
reliability information [17]. In addition, helper data ma-
nipulation should be carefully handled, e.g., via integrity
check regardless of weak PUF and strong PUF [15], [18]. We
ultimately remove the usage of helper data. Therefore, all
attacks induced from the helper data are avoided.
7.2 Generic
Firstly, the TREVERSE authentication is generic to all
PUF types as long as the PUF has its corresponding
SimPUF. Secondly, the validated two simple yet efficient
and complementary authentication augment methods—d-
authentication and multiple-reference—to enhance TRE-
VERSE authentication capability are also applicable to all
PUF types.
7.3 Server-Aided
The TREVERSE authentication fully takes advantage of
resource-rich server. Firstly, it is the server enrolling the
SimPUF during the enrollment, then grading the PUF re-
sponse reliability confidence, to carry out the trials and
checks during the authentication phase. Secondly, for the
recommended TREVERSE-B instantiation where the LAPUF
is exploited, the server exploits machine learning techniques
to easily build/enroll the SimPUF of the LAPUF.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The developed TREVERSE authentication fully leverages
computational resource-rich server to ensure a lightweight
token realization. We ultimately discard expensive ECC
logic, thus, removing the necessity of the helper data
that always leaks exploitable information to an adversary.
Through implementing the d-authentication and multiple-
reference that complement with each other to exponentially
enhance the authentication capability, we assure the authen-
tication to be completed within (tens) thousands of trials
by tolerating BER up to 9.66% and 14.53% for ROPUF and
LAPUF, respectively. Notably, there is no difficult for the
server enrolling more referenced responses to further reduce
the trials. Such an achievement guarantees the devised
TREVERSE applicable to practical application scenarios that
a bunch of tokens are authenticated concurrently. We believe
that in practice parallel computation can also be adopted to
further expedite the TREVERSE authentication.
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TABLE 7
FRRd of the ROPUF under different operating conditions and
m = 12, 14, 16 settings, where n = 64 and d = 10.
25◦C, 0.96 V 25◦C, 1.08 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.32 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m FRRd FRRd FRRd FRRd FRRd
12 20.60%; 35.30% 0%; 5.09×10−5 0%; < 10−9 0%; 4.39×10−4 0.10%; 16.44%
14 8.00%; 17.97% 0%; 1.4×10−6 0%; < 10−9 0%; 2.48×10−5 0%; 5.71%
16 2.50%; 8.22% 0%; 2.13×10−8 0%; < 10−9 0%; 1.27×10−6 0%; 1.65%
The FRRd based on empirical evaluations and statistical analyses
based on Eq(12) are listed for comparison. The format is (empiri-
cal;statistical).
TABLE 8
FRRd of the LAPUF under different operating conditions and
m = 12, 14, 16 settings, where n = 64 and d = 10.
25◦C, 0.96 V 25◦C, 1.08 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.32 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m FRRd FRRd FRRd FRRd FRRd
12 88.20%; 88.09% 0.10%; 1.09% 0%; < 10−9 0.10%; 0.10% 7.00%; 6.74%
14 78.00%; 77.47% 0%; 0.16% 0%; < 10−9 0.10%; 6.76×10−5 2.20%; 1.82%
16 64.20%; 63.30% 0%; 1.44×10−4 0%; < 10−9 0%; 2.44×10−6 0.40%; 0.34%
The FRRd based on empirical evaluations and statistical analyses
based on Eq(12) are listed for comparison. The format is (empiri-
cal;statistical).
APPENDIX
.1 Results of d-Authentication
In Tables 7 and 8, we give empirical and statistical eval-
uations on the FRRd of ROPUF and LAPUF respectively.
When the d = 10, the FRRd is significantly reduced. In
practice, considering that the PUF operating condition vary
not too much, e.g., no more than 10% voltage deviation
(1.08 V-1.32 V), the d-authentication can already minimize
the FRRd to be acceptable. For example, when the m = 16,
the FRRd is always less than 10−3.
.2 Results of Multiple-Reference
In Table 9, the λ1, λ2 and  of the ROPUF based on two
referenced operating corners, ref1 of (25◦C, 1.08 V) and ref2
of (25◦C, 1.32 V), are experimentally evaluated.
In Tables 10 and 11 , by using two-reference, we experi-
mentally and statistically evaluate the FRRref1 , FRRref2 and
consequently FRRmr for ROPUF and LAPUF, respectively.
It is obvious that the FRRmr is significantly reduced. For
example, in Table 2, the FRR of the ROPUF is up to 90%
when a single referenced operating corner is used under the
settings of m = 12, n = 64. In Table 10, the FRRmr is sub-
stantially reduced to 27% when two-reference is exploited
under the same m and n settings.
TABLE 9
λ1;ref and ref of ROPUF under different operating conditions and the
λ2;ref .
Operating condition ref1 λ1;ref1 λ2;ref1 ref2 λ1;ref2 λ2;ref2
(25◦C, 0.96 V) 5.20% 0.4477 -0.3276 14.20% 0.5029 -0.3613
(25◦C, 1.08 V) 0.96% 0.0324 -0.3276 9.30% 0.3533 -0.3613
(65◦C, 1.20 V) 6.39% 0.2389 -0.3276 3.92% 0.1961 -0.3613
(25◦C, 1.32 V) 9.29% 0.4579 -0.3276 0.76% 0.0266 -0.3613
(25◦C, 1.44 V) 11.09% 0.5808 -0.3276 2.24% 0.1082 -0.3613
16
TABLE 10
FRRM of the ROPUF under different operating conditions and m = 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 settings, where n = 64 with two references (25◦C, 1.08 V)
and 25◦C, 1.32 V.
25◦C, 0.96 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m (FRRref1 ;FRRref2 ;FRRM ) (FRRref1 ;FRRref2 ;FRRM ) (FRRref1 ;FRRref2 ;FRRM )
8 (53.32%; 99.66%; 52.45%), (69.33%; 99.60%; 69.05%) (71.83%; 30.62%; 23.06%), (79.52%; 63.31%; 50.34%) (97.86%; 4.85%; 4.93%), (99.24%; 19.72%; 19.57%)
10 (39.11%; 99.23%; 39.43%), (54.13%; 99.15%; 53.67%) (59.57%; 18.42%; 12.27%), (68.53%; 49.87%; 34.18%) (95.76%; 1.78%; 1.68%), (98.47%; 10.38%; 10.22)
12 (26.90%; 98.43%; 26.64%), (42.20%; 98.35%; 41.50%) (47.52%; 10.14%; 5.81%), (56.92%; 37.47%; 21.33%) (92.50%; 0.69%; 0.35%), (97.31%; 6.22%; 6.05%)
14 (17.18%; 97.29%; 17.25%), (31.15%; 97.22%; 30.28%) (36.16%; 4.90%; 2.64%), (45.98%; 26.50%; 12.18%) (87.85%; 0.17%; 0.06%), (95.14%; 3.75%; 3.57%)
16 (10.26%; 95.47%; 10.63%), (21.99%; 95.03%; 20.90%) (26.06%; 2.41%; 1.00%), (36.52%; 17.40%; 6.35%) (82.02%; 0.07%; 0.02%), (92.36%; 2.64%; 2.44%)
Before ‘,’ shows empirical results, after ‘,’ shows statistical results.
TABLE 11
FRRM of the LAPUF under different operating conditions and m = 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 settings, where n = 64 with two references (25◦C, 1.08 V) and
(25◦C, 1.32 V).
25◦C, 0.96 V 65◦C, 1.20 V 25◦C, 1.44 V
m (FRRref1 ;FRRref2 ;FRRM ) (FRRref1 ;FRRref2 ;FRRM ) (FRRref1 ;FRRref2 ;FRRM )
8 (82.32%; 99.99%; 83.77%), (82.21%; 99.95%; 82.16%) (95.25%; 53.22%; 49.29%), (94.18%; 45.47%; 42.84%) (99.85%; 11.61%; 10.39%), (99.75%; 13.73%; 13.70%)
10 (72.70%; 99.98%; 74.53%), (72.82%; 99.90%; 72.75%) (91.63%; 38.99%; 34.18%), (90.29%; 31.60%; 28.53%) (99.67%; 5.22%; 4.63%), (99.40%; 7.91%; 7.86%)
12 (61.63%; 99.98%; 63.92%), (61.24%; 99.90%; 61.19%) (86.16%; 26.89%; 22.72%), (83.50%; 20.45%; 17.08%) (99.37%; 2.02%; 1.80%), (98.81%; 5.00%; 4.94%)
14 (50.23%; 99.97%; 51.84%), (49.36%; 99.89%; 49.31%) (79.36%; 17.31%; 13.86%), (76.41%; 13.05%; 9.97%) (98.85%; 0.72%; 0.66%), (97.70%; 3.70%; 3.61%)
16 (39.58%; 99.94%; 41.15%), (38.19%; 99.87%; 38.14%) (71.68%; 10.27%; 7.56%), (67.77%; 8.01%; 5.43%) (97.87%; 0.22%; 0.21%), (96.27%; 3.06%; 2.95%)
Before ‘,’ shows empirical results, after ‘,’ shows statistical results.
